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TOWARD EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: “RACHEL’S LAW” AND 
THE PROTECTION OF DRUG INFORMANTS 
Ian Leson* 
Abstract: Following the murder of Rachel Morningstar Hoffman—a 23-
year-old college graduate—Florida passed “Rachel’s Law,” which estab-
lished new guidelines for the police when dealing with confidential infor-
mants. Immediately prior to its enactment, lawmakers stripped Rachel’s 
Law of key provisions. These provisions required police to provide a po-
tential informant with an attorney before agreeing to any deal. Opponents 
of these provisions argue that they hamstring law enforcement agencies in 
their efforts to prosecute drug crimes. Rather than serving as an obstacle 
to effective law enforcement, the attorney provision in the original version 
of Rachel’s Law enables efficient prosecution of crimes and protects minor 
drug offenders who may be unsuited for potentially dangerous undercover 
informant work. This Note recommends that the attorney provision be re-
stored to Rachel’s Law, and encourages other states to enact similar stat-
utes. 
Introduction 
 In 2008, police arrested Rachel Hoffman, a 23-year-old Florida 
State University graduate, after they found ecstasy pills and marijuana 
in her apartment.1 Facing multiple drug charges, she became an in-
formant for the police department in Tallahassee, Florida.2 As part of a 
drug sting, Rachel attempted to buy cocaine and a firearm from two 
 
* Managing Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–
2012). 
1 See Jennifer Portman, Father Pushes for ‘Rachel Law’: Irv Hoffman Aims to Protect Young In-
formants, Tallahassee Democrat, May 20, 2008, at 1A; Alex Leary, House Passes ‘Rachel’s Law’ 
to Protect Police Informants, Miami Herald Blog (Apr. 27, 2009), http://miamiherald.typepad. 
com/nakedpolitics/2009/04/house-passes-rachels-law-to-protect-police-informants.html. 
2 See Portman, supra note 1. 
392 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:391 
felons targeted by the police.3 Police recovered her body thirty-six 
hours later; Rachel had died from a gunshot wound.4 
 The public heavily criticized the Tallahassee police department for 
its handling of Hoffman, particularly for failing to provide her with 
proper training in her role as an informant.5 Soon after her death, 
Hoffman’s parents and Florida lawmakers lobbied for the passage of 
confidential informant reform legislation.6 As a result, Florida passed 
“Rachel’s Law” in 2009, becoming the first state to provide new policies 
and procedures for the use of informants by law enforcement.7 Ra-
chel’s Law requires the police to consider an informant’s suitability for 
a particular agreement, including age, maturity, and the attendant risks 
of harm.8 The law requires police to inform suspects that police offi-
cers are not authorized to decide whether criminal charges are 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Julian Pecquet, AG to Review Hoffman Case: TPD Informant Procedures to Be Examined, 
Tallahassee Democrat, May 13, 2008, at 1A; Leary, supra note 1; Alexandra Natapoff, Regu-
lating Criminal Snitching, Loyola L. Sch. L.A. Daily J., http://media.lls.edu/CivDisc091509. 
html (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). Police searched Hoffman’s apartment after another infor-
mant told them she was dealing marijuana. Pecquet, supra. 
4 See Portman, supra note 1; Leary, supra note 1. 
5 See Michael L. Rich, Coerced Informants and Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on the Po-
lice-Informant Relationship, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 681, 683–84 (2010) (providing an over-
view of criticism in the aftermath of Hoffman’s death). 
6 See Portman, supra note 1; Mike Salinero, ‘Rachel’s Law’ Loses Major Provisions, Tampa 
Tribune, Mar. 19, 2009, at 6. 
7 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28 (2010); Natapoff, supra note 3. In addition to Florida, other 
states have developed guidelines regarding police informants, but these state laws are fo-
cused on ensuring the reliability of information rather than the safety of the informants 
themselves. See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: Criminal Informants and the Ero-
sion of American Justice 193–97 (2009). Local police departments have varying levels of 
internal regulations that address the use of informants. See id. at 187–88. For example, the 
Las Vegas Police Department has written guidelines that require officers to keep files on 
their informants and advise them that they are not permitted to commit crimes while 
gathering information. See id. at 188. Some states, such as New Jersey, regulate the use of 
juvenile informants, with an eye toward their well-being. See The New Jersey School 
Search Policy Manual, at A10-1 app. 10 (1998), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ 
dcj/school/school1.pdf. The New Jersey regulations prohibit the use of juvenile infor-
mants who are participating in substance abuse treatment or have a history of mental ill-
ness. See id. at A10-2. They explicitly aim to address “the danger to the juvenile of acting as 
an informant.” Id. On the federal level, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has issued com-
prehensive guidelines that are used to regulate the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in their use of confidential informants. See 
John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the use of 
Confidential Informants 1 (2002), available at http://www.ignet.gov/pande/standards/ 
invprg1211apph.pdf. In 2006, the DOJ issued even more specific guidelines regulating the 
use of FBI informants. See Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., The Attorney General’s 
Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources 1–3 (2006), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/ag-guidelines-use-of-fbi-chs.pdf. 
8 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28(5)(a)–(h). 
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dropped or altered.9 It also legislates for more efficient investigations, 
such as a provision requiring law enforcement to consider “[t]he risk 
the person poses to adversely affect a present or potential investigation 
or prosecution . . . .”10 
 While applauded in many circles, lawmakers stripped the final ver-
sion of Rachel’s Law of certain key provisions.11 Among them was a re-
quirement that suspects be told they can see an attorney before agree-
ing to deals.12 Other provisions would have prohibited the use of 
individuals participating in substance abuse programs as informants 
without obtaining court approval.13 Lawmakers also removed a prohibi-
tion on using nonviolent offenders in operations targeting violent fel-
ons.14 While these provisions disappeared in concession to law en-
forcement interests in Florida, they were the ones most aggressively 
lobbied for by Rachel’s parents.15 State Senator Mike Fasano, a propo-
nent of the bill, explained that “‘if you want to keep a bill moving, you 
have to give a little something . . . .’”16 
 In general, the law enforcement community has been reluctant to 
embrace informant reform.17 Informants are an essential element in 
criminal prosecution and law enforcement officials argue that they risk 
a disadvantage when informant interactions are slowed.18 Thus, they 
                                                                                                                      
 
9 See id. § 914.28(3)(a). 
10 Id. § 914.28(5)(b). 
11 See Salinero, supra note 6. 
12 Compare Fla. Stat. § 914.28, with S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 5(b), Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009). 
13 See S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 4(a). 
14 Compare Fla. Stat. § 914.28 (2010), with S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 4(a). 
15 See Salinero, supra note 6. General counsel for the Florida Department of Law En-
forcement testified to the State Senate Committee on Criminal Justice that “the original 
bill would bring drug investigations using confidential informants to a ‘screeching halt.’” 
Id. Florida newspaper reports alleged that the provisions disappeared at the behest of law 
enforcement agencies. See id.; Leary, supra note 1. 
16 Salinero, supra note 6. 
17 See Law Enforcement Confidential Informant Practices: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. & the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liber-
ties of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 110th Cong. 76–78 (2007) [hereinafter 
Joint Hearing] (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, National Narcotic Officers’ Associa-
tion Coalition) (“[I]n the vast majority of the thousands of . . . investigations that I have con-
ducted or supervised there would not have been a successful conclusion had it not been for 
the information provided or access gained through the use of an informant.”). 
18 See United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 334–35 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[O]ur 
criminal justice system could not adequately function without information provided by 
informants . . . .”); Rich, supra note 5, at 688–89; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The 
Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 645, 655 (2004) (“Our justice 
system has become increasingly dependent on criminal informants over the past twenty 
years, primarily as a result of the confluence of several related trends: the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), mandatory minimum sentences, and the explosion of 
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argue, the crime-fighting enterprise is harmed when police officers 
must offer an offender the opportunity to speak with an attorney be-
fore making a deal.19 This perspective, however, ignores the fact that 
informants—such as Rachel Hoffman, a nonviolent drug offender with 
no training—are too often put at risk.20 
 Evidence shows that Hoffman’s situation was not an isolated inci-
dent.21 In 1998, seventeen-year-old Chad MacDonald was pulled over for 
speeding by California police and the officers found methampheta-
mines.22 After arresting him, they gave him a choice between prosecu-
tion and working as an informant.23 The police failed to tell him that, as 
a first-time offender, he could have enrolled in a drug rehabilitation 
program.24 The day before MacDonald’s birthday, after two months of 
                                                                                                                      
drug crime enforcement efforts.”); Salinero, supra note 6. In particular, informants are 
essential to the prosecution of drug crimes. See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 66 (state-
ment of Alexandra Natapoff, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School) (“Informants are a 
cornerstone of drug enforcement. It is sometimes said that every drug case involves a 
snitch.”). Law enforcement officials argue that restrictions on the use of informants would 
make these prosecutions more difficult. See id. at 87 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, Presi-
dent, National Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition). 
19 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 87 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, Na-
tional Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition); Salinero, supra note 6. 
20 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 66 (testimony of Alexandra Natapoff, Professor of 
Law, Loyola Law School) (“The government’s use of criminal informants is largely secre-
tive, unregulated, and largely unaccountable.”); Natapoff, supra note 18, at 670–671 (dis-
cussing the problem of broad law enforcement discretion); Portman, supra note 1. 
21 See, e.g., Michael Beebe, Walking Thin Line in Village of Attica: Would-Be Informant Says 
Police Coerced Her into Cooperation, Buffalo News, Nov. 8, 2009, at A1 (describing the story 
of Bianca Hervey, who was recruited as an informant after being stopped for driving with a 
suspended license); Scott Martelle & Bonnie Hayes, Fatal Deception: Web of Lies May Have 
Snared Young Drug-User-Turned-Informant, Killed Allegedly by People Who Knew of His Ties to 
Police, L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1998, at A3 (describing the story of Chad MacDonald, who was 
killed after becoming an informant); see also Rich, supra note 5, at 682–83 (citations omit-
ted) (“Hoffman’s situation is typical of those faced by an increasing number of civilians 
who assist police in exchange for leniency.”). In September 2009, in the town of Attica, 
New York, police pulled over a twenty-year-old college student named Bianca Hervey for 
driving with a suspended license. See Beebe, supra. Handcuffed to a bench and told by 
police she would spend the night in jail, Hervey agreed to become a confidential infor-
mant for the county drug task force. Id. Hervey’s situation is especially alarming because, 
unlike Rachel Hoffman, Hervey had no association with drugs. See id.; Salinero, supra note 
6. Attica Police Chief William Smith made clear to the young woman’s father, a lawyer who 
rushed to her aid before she was harmed, that he had no plans to change the practice. See 
Beebe, supra. “‘[Hervey’s father] doesn’t like the way police do things, I guess . . . . He 
doesn’t like the way it’s done . . . . It is what it is.’” Id. 
22 See Michael R. Santiago, Comment, “The Best Interests of the Child” —Scrutinizing Cali-
fornia’s Use of Minors as Police Informants in Drug Cases, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 777, 778 
(2000); Martelle & Hayes, supra note 21. 
23 Santiago, supra note 22, at 778. 
24 See id. 
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police informant work, the police recovered a “tortured and battered 
body . . . .”25 MacDonald’s mother filed a missing persons report five 
days after she last saw him, and using that information, the police identi-
fied the recovered body as MacDonald’s.26 As a result of MacDonald’s 
case, California adopted legislation protecting juvenile informants.27 
 While Rachel’s Law is an important step toward meaningful re-
form, the protection of informants requires even more attention.28 
This Note argues that reinstating some of the fundamental considera-
tions included in the original version of Rachel’s Law will protect the 
less-than-ready informant and make law enforcement more efficient.29 
Part I provides a brief history of the police practice of using confiden-
tial informants. Part II looks at the current state of the informant sys-
tem. It describes the flaws in the system and the ways in which the sys-
tem implicates the Constitution. Part III examines the differences 
between the original and final versions of Rachel’s Law, and focuses on 
the provisions providing a right to counsel and protection for infor-
mants in drug rehabilitation programs. Part IV argues for reinstating 
the stripped provisions and explains why restoring them, at least in 
part, would serve the needs of both informants and law enforcement. 
The Note concludes by encouraging other states to enact legislation 
similar to the original version of Rachel’s Law. 
I. The Use of Criminal Informants in Law Enforcement 
 The use of informants can be traced back from ancient Greece, 
through Judas Iscariot, to Britain in the Middle Ages, and onward 
through modern times.30 The reasons behind the use of informants 
have changed over time, but one persistent theme is the rooting out of 
anti-government sentiment and activity.31 
 By the thirteenth century Britain employed what was known as the 
“approver system,” where “a person accused of treason or a felony could 
                                                                                                                      
25 Id. 
26 See Martelle & Hayes, supra note 21. 
27 See Santiago, supra note 22, at 781. 
28 See Rich, supra note 5, at 682–85; Portman, supra note 1; Natapoff, supra note 3. 
29 See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 183–84 (explaining that making counsel available to 
informants will “improve the fairness and regularity of the process”); Rich, supra note 5, at 
694–96, 698–99 (describing how law enforcement agencies become less able to recruit new 
informants when they develop a reputation for “burning” them). 
30 See Robert M. Bloom, Ratting: The use and Abuse of Informants in the 
American Justice System 1, 3, 5, 7 (2002). 
31 See id. at 2, 5, 7. 
396 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:391 
confess and inform on any remaining accused persons.”32 If successful, 
the approver could be pardoned and exiled.33 If the information was 
false, however, the approver could be executed.34 For those accused of 
murder, there were few reasons not to risk informing, thereby raising 
questions of reliability and leading to the system’s abuse.35 After all, the 
informant risked execution either way.36 By the eighteenth century, the 
approver system gave way to the informal practice of confessing to a 
crime and revealing one’s accomplices in the hopes of receiving leni-
ency.37 The use of confidential informants then increased as law en-
forcement in Western Europe began to “professionalize.”38 
 American courts addressed the use of informants in the middle of 
the twentieth century when defendants alleged that confidential in-
formant testimony violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.39 
In an oft-quoted passage, Judge Learned Hand explained, “[c]ourts 
have countenanced the use of informers from time immemorial . . . it is 
usually necessary to rely upon them or upon accomplices because the 
criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly. Entrapment excluded, 
. . . decoys and other deception are always permissible.”40 In 1966, the 
Supreme Court sanctioned the use of informants, calling the practice 
“not per se unconstitutional.”41 The Court explained that “[t]he estab-
lished safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system,” such as cross-
examination and jury determinations of credibility, addressed any con-
stitutional concerns about informant evidence.42 
                                                                                                                      
 
32 Id. at 5; see also Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1, 7 (1992). 
33 Bloom, supra note 30, at 5. 
34 Id. 
35 See id. 
36 Id. 
37 See Hughes, supra note 32, at 7 (“This practice was rife in the nineteenth century 
when the lack of an organized police force often made it essential to procure accomplice 
testimony in order to track down or build a case against a major criminal.”). 
38 Bloom, supra note 30, at 2. 
39 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310–11 (1966); United States v. Dennis, 183 
F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
40 Dennis, 183 F.2d at 224. 
41 See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311. 
42 Id. In his dissent, however, Chief Justice Warren questioned the blanket approval of 
the use of informants in criminal trials. See id. at 315 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Warren 
explained: 
At this late date in the annals of law enforcement, it seems to me that we can-
not say either that every use of informers and undercover agents is proper or, 
on the other hand, that no uses are. There are some situations where the law 
could not adequately be enforced without the employment of some guile or 
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 Modern law enforcement agencies focus their use of informants 
on ferreting out individual criminals.43 Informants permeate every 
level of the criminal justice system, particularly in the investigation of 
drug crimes.44 Indeed, the U.S. government’s “War on Drugs” in-
creased the use of informants in the prosecution of drug crimes.45 Pro-
fessor Alexandra Natapoff explains that “approximately one-third of 
criminal offenders are under the influence of drugs at the time of their 
offenses, while as many as 80 percent of inmates have a history of sub-
stance abuse.”46 These offenders have information and contacts that 
make them ideal informants.47 Informants are “irreplaceable” in the 
context of “the investigation of narcotics, prostitution, and other vice 
crimes, because inside information is often necessary for police to 
learn about their occurrence.”48 
 There are several categories of informants.49 Some are paid by the 
police for their cooperation.50 Others are voluntary, sharing informa-
tion with police out of “feelings of civic duty” or for other various rea-
                                                                                                                      
misrepresentation of identity . . . . However, one of the important duties of 
this Court is to give careful scrutiny to practices of government agents when 
they are challenged in cases before us, in order to insure that the protections 
of the Constitution are respected and to maintain the integrity of federal law 
enforcement. 
Id. 
43 See Bloom, supra note 30, at 7. 
44 See United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 335 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the 
importance of the use of informants to “penetrate and destroy” drug cartels); Joint Hearing, 
supra note 17, at 77 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, National Narcotic Officers’ 
Association Coalition); Bloom, supra note 30, at 7 (“In order for law enforcement authori-
ties to solve crimes such as drug dealing . . . they need information from individuals who 
are either closely aligned with the participants or are participants themselves.”); Natapoff, 
supra note 18, at 655; see also Shawn Armbrust, Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses: Why the Red-
Headed Stepchild of New Evidence Deserves Another Look, 28 B.C. Third World L.J. 75, 93 
(2008) (“In recent years, the practice of rewarding informants has become more pro-
nounced and more entrenched in the justice system.”). 
45 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 669 (stating that “the war on drugs made snitches a 
law enforcement fixture”). 
46 Natapoff, supra note 7, at 106. 
47 Id.; see also Natapoff, supra note 18, at 671 (“‘I can’t tell you the last time I heard a 
drug case of any substance in which the government did not have at least one informant,’ 
related District Judge Marvin Shoob.”). 
48 Rich, supra note 5, at 688–89; see also Susan S. Kuo, Official Indiscretions: Considering 
Sex Bargains with Government Informants, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1643, 1650 (2005) (calling 
these victimless crimes “invisible offenses”). 
49 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 652; Rich, supra note 5, at 690. 
50 See Rich, supra note 5, at 690 (describing informants “against whom the police do 
not have evidence of other crimes to use as leverage”). 
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sons.51 The third category—into which Rachel Hoffman fell—is com-
posed of offenders trading cooperation in exchange for leniency.52 
Professor Michael Rich calls this subcategory “coerced informants” be-
cause the government claims to have sufficient evidence for a convic-
tion.53 Most active informants are coerced informants.54 
 Coerced informants are subject to intense pressures to cooper-
ate.55 For instance, an offender’s uncertainty is highest immediately 
following arrest.56 This “mak[es] her most likely to agree to cooperate 
at that time.”57 When the individual does not readily offer information, 
“the most powerful motivational tool available to the police or prosecu-
tor is the fear of criminal charges and a long prison sentence.”58 The 
promise of leniency, sometimes vague and uncertain, can be enough to 
“flip” an offender.59 
 Critics often overlook the issue of coercion, instead focusing on 
the inherent unreliability of information generated by informants.60 
This focus solely on reliability concerns, however, masks other flaws in 
                                                                                                                      
51 Id. Other reasons may include a desire to associate with the police or a wish to 
eliminate criminal competition. See id. Professor Robert Bloom discusses the many theories 
behind what may have motivated Judas Iscariot, who “remains the epitome of betrayal and 
informing to many,” and suggests that the same motivations continue to influence infor-
mants. Bloom, supra note 30, at 4–5. These motivations include greed, hate, jealously, and 
altruism. See id. at 4. 
52 See Rich, supra note 5, at 690. 
53 Id. at 691–92. 
54 Id. at 695. 
55 See id. at 691–92. 
56 Id. at 694. 
57 Rich, supra note 5, at 694. 
58 Id. In some cases, informants who stop cooperating may be placed in jail for a night 
to think it over. Id. at 700. This is not, however, the only tool at law enforcement’s disposal. 
See Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the Criminal System, 30 
Cardozo L. Rev. 965, 969 (2008) (“Police and prosecutors create criminal informants 
using everything from threats to friendship to deceit to sex.”). Informants may even earn 
the permission to commit new offenses. Id. 
59 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 652; Rich, supra note 5, at 682–83. Officers and prose-
cutors tend to have broad discretion when making offers to informants. See Natapoff, supra 
note 18, at 652–53. Sometimes, rather than a promise of outright forgiveness for a crime, 
the informant is told the prosecutor will make a non-binding recommendation to impose 
a lower sentence. Id. at 652. In other cases, the informant is promised nothing at all at the 
outset, with any reward being contingent on the quality of the work or information the 
informant eventually provides. See id. For example, Tallahassee police told Rachel Hoff-
man that “she only had to provide ‘substantial assistance’ or do ‘one big deal’ to avoid 
charges . . . .” Rich, supra note 5, at 682. 
60 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 651, 663–64. Addicted informants and informants 
with mental health issues are especially prone to unreliability because of their vulnerability 
to coercion. See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 184–85. 
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the informant system.61 For example, Rachel Hoffman provided offi-
cials with labor rather than information or witness testimony, so the 
question of reliability did not apply in her case.62 Focusing too much 
on the unreliability of snitches as witnesses “obscures the nature of the 
mechanisms by which that unreliable testimony is created.”63 The in-
formant institution’s biggest flaw is arguably the controversial and se-
cretive mechanism by which informants are coerced into informing.64 
II. Fundamental Flaws in the Informant Institution 
 Informants generally have little recourse when wronged or harmed 
by law enforcement and, therefore, are in need of an attorney when 
they first consider becoming an informant.65 Some see an informant 
agreement as “an extreme form of plea bargain[ing]” and, even though 
pleas in court are a product of counsel, none is provided to informants 
making similar decisions on the street.66 Lack of counsel particularly 
affects those with substance abuse or mental health problems.67 
A. The Coerced Informant and the Constitution 
 The process of flipping an alleged offender into an informant cir-
cumvents the protections of the Bill of Rights because it lacks uniform 
rules and is unchecked by outside scrutiny.68 Unlike someone who en-
gages in a plea agreement, a coerced informant is generally not given 
the benefits of judicial review, formal documentation, or assistance of 
counsel.69 While the lack of constraints may be preferable for law en-
                                                                                                                      
 
61 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 664. 
62 See id.; Portman, supra note 1. 
63 Natapoff, supra note 18, at 664 (“[W]hile informants may well be inherently unreli-
able, that is not their worst feature. Rather, their use is problematic because it undermines 
the uniform application of criminal liability rules, the accountability of law enforcement, 
and, for some neighborhoods, the well-being of a community.”). 
64 See id. at 659; Rich, supra note 5, at 684–87. Professor Alexandra Natapoff suggests a 
series of public accountability reforms for the informant institution generally because of 
the “informal, ad hoc way it eliminates or reduces criminal liability off the public record.” 
Natapoff, supra note 18, at 658, 696–98. 
65 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 667; Rich, supra note 5, at 694, 701. 
66 Natapoff, supra note 18, at 664. 
67 See S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 4(a)–(b), Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009); Natapoff, supra note 18, 
at 664–66; Natapoff, supra note 3. 
68 See Rich, supra note 5, at 685–86. For example, Professor Rich theorizes that coerced 
informants are subject to involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Id. 
69 See id. at 695; see also Natapoff, supra note 18, at 667–68 (contrasting cooperation 
deals with plea bargains). Professor Natapoff explains: 
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forcement as a way to remain unrestrained, their absence places the 
rights of informants at risk.70 Officials use this unrestrained expediency 
to keep potential informants isolated and off-balance.71 By its nature, 
expediency raises questions of due process and fairness to the infor-
mant.72 
 At times, the criminal informant institution functions as an infor-
mal and covert adjudication of criminal liability.73 Nevertheless, infor-
mants who later claim that the process of being flipped violated their 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel are unlikely to have success.74 The 
Supreme Court held that this right does not attach until the govern-
ment has initiated adversarial proceedings against a defendant.75 Yet, 
without the benefit of counsel, an alleged offender may not be able to 
understand the strength or weakness of the evidence.76 A fearful sus-
                                                                                                                      
 
[T]he suspect approached by police and invited to snitch has no right to 
counsel, even though the decision to inform may have a greater and more 
lasting impact on his life than the decision whether or not to plead guilty. By 
contrast, the defendant who decides to exercise his constitutional right to 
proceed to enter a guilty plea without counsel will receive a lecture from the 
judge on the heavy risks of doing so and a probing inquiry as to whether he 
understands those risks. 
Natapoff, supra note 18, at 667 (citations omitted). 
70 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 87 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, Na-
tional Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition); Rich, supra note 5, at 685–86. 
71 See Rich, supra note 5, at 696 (“Shortly after an arrest, police maximize the arrestee’s 
fear of a long sentence by emphasizing the maximum penalties for the crimes with which 
she might be charged and suggesting that the only easy way out is for her to cooperate.”). 
72 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 663–64; Rich, supra note 5, at 685–86, 695–96. The 
combination of fear tactics and the secrecy inherent in the informant recruitment process 
almost encourages ethically questionable behavior on the part of police. Rich, supra note 
5, at 696 (citations omitted) (“[B]ecause many criminal defense attorneys will discourage 
their clients from becoming informants, police make arrests at night, when defense coun-
sel are least likely to be available, or discourage arrestees from contacting their attor-
neys.”). 
73 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 658. For example, police in the Hoffman case did not 
take her to jail or inform the local prosecutor of the evidence found in her apartment. 
Pecquet, supra note 3. A spokesman for the Tallahassee Police Department said “the prac-
tice is not uncommon.” Id. In the weeks after Hoffman’s death, a lobbyist for the ACLU in 
Tallahassee, Larry Helm Spalding, said, “‘[w]hen police make the decision (whether to 
charge someone with a crime), they’re making the prosecution decision for the prosecutor 
. . . . You have a system here that while it is very effective, it is also very subject to abuse.’” 
Id. 
74 See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984) (holding that the right to 
counsel does not attach until after indictment). 
75 See id. 
76 See Rich, supra note 5, at 682–83 (citations omitted) (noting that Hoffman “lacked a 
meaningful understanding of the charges she could face as a result of the drugs found in 
her apartment, or what she had to do in order to receive leniency”). For instance, an offi-
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pect unaware of the law may agree to cooperate without knowing that 
the officer has no valid case.77 Indeed, even in cases with insufficient 
evidence against a suspect, officers may nevertheless claim that charges 
are going to be filed.78 
 When informants are wronged by police, they have two potential 
remedies: claiming a substantive due process violation or suing in tort.79 
Substantive due process claims may be possible under the “state-created 
danger” doctrine.80 Such claims, however, face several hurdles.81 An in-
formant must demonstrate that the state was obligated to provide pro-
tection and that its failure to do so shocked the conscience.82 Yet, even if 
an informant is able to meet this burden, such claims often fail in light 
of the qualified immunity of law enforcement officials.83 
 A wronged informants may also “assert state-law tort claims against 
the individual officers” or agencies for which they worked.84 An infor-
                                                                                                                      
cer claiming to have incriminating evidence against a suspect may have obtained it ille-
gally. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967) (defining the expectation of 
privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and refusing to adopt the government’s 
position on the legality of its actions). 
77 See Rich, supra note 5, at 682–83. For some informants, knowledge of police tactics 
comes after repeated arrests. See Richard Rosenfeld et al., Snitching and the Code of the Street, 
43 Brit. J. Criminology 291, 300 (2003). One interviewee described the wisdom he had 
accrued after several encounters with the police: 
‘We’ll let you go by eight tonight’ [if you tell us what we want to know, said 
the police], and I’m like, the warrant got to get issued . . . if the warrant don’t 
get issued, you gonna get out anyway by 8 o’clock tonight. They don’t think I 
know that, but I’ve been locked up so much I know all that shit . . . got out 
that night . . . . 
Id. Another interviewee claimed to know that the police were not in a position to offer 
deals at all. Id. 
78 See Rich, supra note 5, at 696. Due process concerns frequently arise when law en-
forcement uses informants, but the concern is over the rights of the defendant and not the 
informant. See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 663–64. 
79 See Rich, supra note 5, at 701–02. 
80 See id. at 702–03; see also Butera v. Dist. of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 647, 654 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (noting that police may violate substantive due process by failing to protect a police 
informant). 
81 See Rich, supra note 5, at 702–03. 
82 See Butera, 235 F.3d at 650–51, 654; Rich, supra note 5, at 702–03. Courts have held 
that the state-created danger doctrine is most applicable in the context of custody, where 
the state has a greater responsibility for the individual. See Butera, 235 F.3d at 647–48. Ac-
knowledging that the concept of custody is itself difficult to clarify, Butera v. District of Co-
lumbia held that a wronged informant may have a claim over a third party’s violent act if 
the police “affirmatively act to increase or create the danger that ultimately results in the 
individual’s harm.” Id. at 651. 
83 See Butera, 235 F.3d at 652, 654 (dismissing claims on qualified immunity grounds). 
84 Rich, supra note 5, at 701. 
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mant may also bring a claim under contract law because state-informant 
agreements are treated as contracts.85 But, due to the differing social 
positions of the parties and for reasons of public policy, courts in these 
disputes tend to make credibility determinations in favor of law en-
forcement.86 
 The dearth of effective legal remedies for a wronged or harmed 
informant is not common knowledge among potential informants and 
shows that legal counsel is necessary before cooperating.87 The mo-
ment of initial confrontation with law enforcement is the “least trans-
parent and therefore most problematic” for the informant.88 At this 
point, the pressure to cooperate is greatest, and potential informants 
are most at risk of making a damaging decision.89 
B. The Absence of Counsel 
 “Lawyers play a particularly important role” for defendants con-
templating cooperation after being charged “because so much turns on 
predictions about the relative benefits of the uncertain path of coop-
eration, compared to taking an ordinary plea or going to trial.”90 The 
same array of problems faces an informant denied the presence of 
counsel at the key moment of negotiation.91 Secrecy, a key ingredient 
of the informant relationship, is a strong argument for requiring par-
ticipation of counsel because many informants likely base their deci-
sions on fear and powerlessness.92 Therefore, suspects like Rachel 
Hoffman who contemplate becoming confidential informants would 
benefit from the expertise of counsel.93 
                                                                                                                      
 
85 Id. at 700. 
86 Id. at 701. 
87 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 659; Rich, supra note 5, at 694. 
88 Natapoff, supra note 18, at 659. 
89 See id.; Rich, supra note 5, at 694 (“A civilian’s uncertainty about her future is highest 
in the hours after being arrested, thus making her most likely to agree to cooperate at that 
time.”). 
90 Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 563, 593 (1999); see 
also Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 89 (1995) (“[E]ven for the 
most knowledgeable defendant, the decision to cooperate will be a leap into the unknown. 
In this situation, the advice of a defense attorney will be critical, perhaps dispositive.”). 
91 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 667; Rich, supra note 5, at 695–96; see also Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 
68 Fordham L. Rev. 917, 936 (1999) (quoting a prosecutor who referred to the time co-
operators spend alone with agents as a “black hole”). 
92 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 658–59; Rich, supra note 5, at 694. 
93 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 659; Rich, supra note 5, at 694; Richman, supra note 
90, at 89; Weinstein, supra note 90, at 593. As Professor Graham Hughes explains, however, 
cooperation deals can be seen as “exotic plants that can survive only in an environment 
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 For some, the informant agreement is “an extreme form of plea 
bargain[ing].”94 Generally, the extensive use of plea bargaining in the 
U.S. criminal justice system is justified by the numerous safeguards in 
place.95 These safeguards include “specificity, completeness, finality, 
enforceability, judicial review and publicity, and . . . counsel.”96 Further, 
if a defendant pleads guilty, the court confirms that she is knowingly 
and voluntarily waiving her right to trial.97 Such safeguards, however, 
are absent in the formation of informant agreements.98 
 Professor Richman characterizes plea bargains as relatively certain, 
while he calls the cooperation process “a leap into uncertainty.”99 In 
the context of a plea bargain, the suspect enjoys the benefits of legal 
counsel’s experience.100 Counsel generally knows the “market” and 
“price” for a given offense, and serves as an “educated purchasing 
agent” who negotiates for the government’s best offer.101 Because of 
these safeguards, the defendant has “no particular need to trust in the 
government’s good faith.”102 
 In contrast, informant agreements are frequently open-ended and 
unspecific, and their details rarely committed to record.103 In the ab-
sence of a formal written contract, “[c]ourts treat an agreement be-
tween an informant and the state like any other contract . . . .”104 Thus, 
informants who draft agreements without the assistance of counsel “will 
be at considerable risk.”105 Often, the size of an informant’s reward is 
contingent on the quality of the work.106 Moreover, the vital question of 
whether an offered deal of leniency or immunity will travel between 
jurisdictions makes the assistance of counsel “virtually indispensible.”107 
                                                                                                                      
from which some of the familiar features of the criminal procedure landscape have been 
expunged.” Hughes, supra note 32, at 3. 
94 Natapoff, supra note 18, at 664. 
95 Id. at 665. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 666–67. This will often include questions about “whether the defendant has 
been threatened or coerced in any way.” Id. at 667. 
98 See id. at 667. 
99 Richman, supra note 90, at 91, 94. 
100 See id. at 92–93. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 92. 
103 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 665–66. 
104 Rich, supra note 5, at 700. 
105 See Hughes, supra note 32, at 41. 
106 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 666. 
107 Hughes, supra note 32, at 42 (noting the value of an attorney who can explain the 
risks of cooperation to a potential cooperator). 
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 Both plea bargains and informant agreements are coercive, and 
the procedural safeguards in place for plea bargains—including the 
availability of counsel, exist in part to counteract that aspect.108 This 
concern with coercion underpinned the Supreme Court’s criminal 
procedure cases during the Warren era.109 Yet, the coercive aspects of 
informant agreements remain largely overlooked.110 
 One potential explanation for this lack of concern is the unregu-
lated nature of the prosecution of “common and diverse” drug crimes, 
which are prosecuted at the state, local, and federal levels.111 As a re-
sult, informant handling practices for drug crime prevention are non-
uniform and crafted on a case-by-case basis.112 In contrast, U.S. attor-
neys in federal criminal practice inform white collar suspects that they 
may consult an attorney while considering a cooperation agreement.113 
The lengthy war on drugs also contributes to the lack of regulation of 
drug crime informants because, as mandatory sentencing laws tighten, 
police pressure intensifies and more people become informants.114 
 Without procedural safeguards and the assistance of counsel, in-
formants like Rachel Hoffman are forced to face these obstacles on 
their own.115 Uninformed about the choices before her, Hoffman 
agreed to cooperate, likely based upon a fear of incarceration.116 As a 
                                                                                                                      
108 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 664–65; Rich, supra note 5, at 691–92. 
109 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966) (establishing minimum stan-
dards by which police officers must inform suspects of their constitutional rights). Chief 
Justice Warren wrote in Miranda v. Arizona, “[t]he presence of counsel at the interrogation 
may serve several significant subsidiary functions as well . . . . With a lawyer present the 
likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless 
exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court.” Id. Even as the Supreme Court later nar-
rowed the holding of Miranda, the notion of coercion has remained central. See Colorado 
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 159, 170 (1986) (holding that coercive police conduct precludes 
a finding of voluntariness in the context of confessions). 
110 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 664–65; see also Salinero, supra note 6 (explaining 
how lawmakers removed provisions of Rachel’s Law—in place to safeguard against the 
coercion of informants—at the behest of law enforcement). 
111 See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 26. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. at 183. Federal suspects receive attorneys due, in part, to the organization 
and uniformity of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice guide-
lines governing federal prosecutors. See Ashcroft, supra note 7, at 17, 19; Gonzales, supra 
note 7, at 27–28; Natapoff, supra note 7, at 26, 141–45 (contrasting unregulated state 
practices with the DOJ’s extensive guidelines). 
114 See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 128; Natapoff, supra note 18, at 696 (“The war on 
drugs and concomitant legislative enactments of the 1980s raised the profile of informants 
in the criminal justice system without increasing protections against their overuse.”). 
115 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 665; Pecquet, supra note 3. 
116 See Rich, supra note 5, at 682–83; Natapoff, supra note 3. 
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result, Rachel’s parents pushed for a law requiring police, among other 
things, to advise a potential informant of his or her right to counsel 
prior to making a cooperation agreement.117 
C. The Use of Informants Enrolled in Drug Rehabilitation Programs 
 The prevalence of informants in drug cases also has societal con-
sequences.118 In particular, the practice where “people routinely nego-
tiate their fates directly with police on street corners or in local jails” 
affects those with substance abuse or mental health problems.119 These 
informants “are more subject to coercion, less likely to be able to make 
good decisions on their own behalf, and as a result more likely to enter 
into bad deals or to get hurt as a result of their cooperation.”120 Lack of 
counsel further worsens the situation for an addicted or mentally dis-
abled informant.121 These informants “can be the most defenseless 
players in the criminal justice drama” because of the unequal bargain-
ing positions of the two sides.122 As a result, the information or assis-
tance these informants provide may be especially unreliable.123 
 Removing drug addicts from substance abuse rehabilitation pro-
grams and turning them into informants is not worth the resultant re-
duction in crime.124 At the same time, drug informants are, by some 
accounts, the backbone of the system.125 These informants serve a par-
ticular utility because they have the most knowledge about, and the 
                                                                                                                      
117 See Salinero, supra note 6. 
118 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 685. Professor Natapoff stresses that the informant 
institution has a particularly negative effect on poor black communities. See id. at 684–87 
(“With half the male population under supervision at any given time, and with more than 
half of this group connected with the illegal drug trade, it is fair to estimate that more than 
one quarter of the black men in the community are under some pressure to snitch.”). The 
use of drug informants also leads to official toleration of large amounts of crime. See id. at 
647–48 (noting that “not only do informants’ past crimes go unpunished, but authorities 
routinely tolerate the commission of new crimes . . . as part of the cost of maintaining an 
active informant”). This practice does little to improve the conditions in high-crime com-
munities. See id. at 687. 
119 Natapoff, supra note 3. 
120 Natapoff, supra note 7, at 184–85. 
121 See id. at 39–41. 
122 Id. at 40. 
123 Id. at 184–85. 
124 See id. (proposing a limit on using drug addicts as informants). In some cases, po-
lice give drugs directly to informants or allow them to “skim” drugs from their deals. Id. at 
54, 184–85. 
125 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 77 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, Na-
tional Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition); Bloom, supra note 30, at 7; Rich, supra 
note 5, at 688–89. 
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most access to, drug communities.126 Using informants solely for this 
reason is difficult to justify in high-crime communities because the “net 
crime-fighting benefit” wanes where informants “facilitate” and “gener-
ate” more crime than they prevent.127 
III. Rachel’s Law—Before and After 
 In March of 2008, police received a tip from a confidential infor-
mant regarding Rachel Hoffman’s involvement in drug activity.128 Po-
lice searched her trash and found a ledger with names and amounts of 
money.129 In April, police searched Hoffman’s apartment.130 They 
found 151.7 grams of marijuana, six ecstasy pills, and other drug para-
phernalia.131 Police did not take Hoffman to jail or notify the prosecu-
tor’s office about the drugs.132 Instead, Hoffman—in a drug treatment 
program at the time—agreed to assist the police.133 
 On May seventh, the police gave Hoffman thirteen thousand dol-
lars and sent her on a controlled drug buy to purchase both drugs and 
weapons.134 She approached two suspected criminals, who then unex-
pectedly changed the meeting plan and directed her to a remote loca-
tion not under police surveillance.135 At this point, the police lost con-
tact with Hoffman.136 They found her body two days later.137 
 The aftermath of Hoffman’s murder saw meaningful discussions 
on reforming informant regulations.138 Newspapers reported that Gov-
ernor Charlie Crist said he would “possibly support a proposed legisla-
tive fix.”139 State senators also expressed their condolences and outrage 
                                                                                                                      
126 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 77 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, Na-
tional Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition); Bloom, supra note 30, at 7; Rich, supra 
note 5, at 688–89. 
127 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 688–89. 
128 See Pecquet, supra, note 3. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See Rich, supra note 5, at 682; Leary, supra note 3; Pecquet, supra note 3. 
134 See Salinero, supra note 6; Leary, supra note 3. 
135 In re Homicide of Rachel Morningstar Hoffman on May 7, 2008 During a Con-
trolled Drug Operation Being Conducted by the Tallahassee Police Department, Grand 
Jury Presentment, 2d Judicial Cir., Leon County, Fla. (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Present-
ment], available at http://www.tallahassee.com/assets/pdf/CD11437281.pdf. 
136 Id. The police department’s audio surveillance equipment failed, and the airplane 
supplied by DEA was unable to monitor the situation from above because of tree-cover. Id. 
137 Salinero, supra note 6. 
138 See Portman, supra note 1. 
139 Id. 
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at the events surrounding Hoffman’s death.140 The Leon County  
grand jury, which issued indictments charging the two suspects with 
first degree murder, was also extremely critical of the Tallahassee Police 
Department.141 “Letting a young, immature woman get into a car by 
herself with $13,000.00, to go off and meet two convicted felons that 
they knew were bringing at least one firearm with them, was an uncon-
scionable decision that cost Ms. Hoffman her life.”142 
 In 2009, the Florida State Senate introduced “Rachel’s Law.”143 
Over the course of its evolution, the bill changed in several key ways.144 
The legal counsel provision of the originally filed bill read as follows: 
Each person who is solicited to act as a confidential informant 
must be given the opportunity to consult with legal counsel 
before entering into a substantial assistance agreement. If the 
person is not represented by legal counsel at the time of the 
solicitation, the law enforcement agency must advise the per-
son of his or her right to consult with legal counsel before en-
tering into the substantial assistance agreement.145 
The legal counsel provision in the final version of the bill does not re-
quire law enforcement officials to advise potential informants of their 
right to counsel.146 It reads as follows: 
                                                                                                                      
140 See id. 
141 See Presentment, supra note 135. 
142 Id. (“Confidential Informants should not be used in transactions of this magnitude 
without a long term working relationship in which they have demonstrated trust, credibil-
ity and an understanding of what is required to complete such work in a safe manner.”). 
143 See Salinero, supra note 6. 
144 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28 (2010); S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § (4)–(6), Reg. Sess. (Fla. 
2009); see also Salinero, supra note 6 (describing the provisions that were removed as the 
bill passed through the Senate Committee on Criminal Justice). 
145 See S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 5(b). Another provision absent from the final version 
concerned substantial assistance agreements, and read as follows: 
Before a proposed confidential informant provides any assistance to a law en-
forcement agency, all plea negotiations and consideration offered to the pro-
posed confidential informant must be reduced to a written substantial assis-
tance agreement that is executed by the law enforcement agency and the 
confidential informant and approved by the state attorney prosecuting the 
case. The substantial assistance agreement must include a description of the 
work that the confidential informant will be doing, the length of service, and 
the consideration that the confidential informant will be receiving. 
Id. 
146 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28(3)(c). 
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A law enforcement agency that uses confidential informants 
shall . . . [p]rovide a person who is requested to serve as a con-
fidential informant with an opportunity to consult with legal 
counsel upon request before the person agrees to perform any 
activities as a confidential informant. However, this section 
does not create a right to publicly funded legal counsel.147 
 The original version of the bill included a provision concerning the 
use of informants in substance abuse programs.148 It specified that a 
confidential informant participating in a court-ordered substance abuse 
treatment program could not be an informant without the permission 
of a supervising circuit judge.149 It also required potential informants 
participating in voluntary substance abuse treatment programs to re-
ceive express approval of a state attorney before accepting.150 The state 
attorney would have had to consult with treatment providers to discuss 
whether working as an informant would jeopardize an individual’s suc-
cess in the program.151 
 The final version of the bill, however, allows law enforcement 
agencies to “establish policies and procedures to assess the suitability of 
using a person as a confidential informant by considering” eight fac-
tors.152 One of these factors is “[w]hether the person is a substance 
abuser or has a history of substance abuse or is in a court-supervised 
drug treatment program . . . .”153 This provision lacks the original bill’s 
express concern with the success of the informant’s treatment.154 
 Another concern initially addressed by Rachel’s Law is a police 
department’s ability to send a nonviolent informant into a drug deal 
                                                                                                                      
147 Id. (emphasis added). 
148 See S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 4(a)–(b). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Fla. Stat. § 914.28(5)(a)–(h) (2010). 
153 Id. § (5)(d). 
154 Compare id., with S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 4(a)–(b), Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009). The ulti-
mate motivation for this provision may be the success of the investigation and not the well-
being of the informant because it is placed among other provisions expressly concerned 
with an informant’s adverse effects on the investigation. See Fla. Stat. § 914.28(5)(a)–(h). 
Another provision requires assessment of “[t]he risk the person poses to adversely affect a 
present or potential investigation or prosecution . . . .” Id. § (5)(b). The law is also con-
cerned with “[w]hether the person has shown any indication of emotional instability, unre-
liability, or of furnishing false information.” Id. § (5)(f). 
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with violent felons.155 The original version required law enforcement 
agencies to consider “[t]he propensity of the target offender for vio-
lence.”156 This provision, however, fails to appear in any form in the 
final version of the bill.157 
IV. Restoring the Right to Counsel and Bolstering the 
Efficiency of Law Enforcement 
 Fully restoring Rachel’s Law to its original form is not a realistic 
ambition, but the goals of the original bill can still be realized.158 Un-
der pressure from Florida law enforcement, Senator Fasano removed 
the contested provisions from the original Rachel’s Law.159 Fasano 
heeded to law enforcement officials’ explanation that restrictions on 
informants obstruct crime fighting.160 Although attempts to impose 
wide-ranging restrictions on the use of informants will likely see resis-
tance, restoring the attorney provision addresses the system’s many in-
herent problems and helps achieve its original goals.161 
A. An Attorney Will Serve as a Catch-All 
 Access to counsel for informants would serve as a potential safe-
guard against the coercive nature of the informant relationship and 
help protect their constitutional rights.162 This benefit is already seen 
with defendants who negotiate cooperation agreements with prosecu-
                                                                                                                      
155 S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 6(c); see Salinero, supra note 6. Hoffman’s father said, 
“‘[h]ow do you send a kid in to do a deal like this? . . . . Rachel was not an undercover 
police officer. This is not a civilian job.’” Portman, supra note 1. 
156 S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § (6)(b)(7). 
157 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28. 
158 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 76–78 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, 
National Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition); Hughes, supra note 37, at 41–43 (de-
scribing the importance of counsel at the early stages of the informant process). 
159 See Salinero, supra note 6. 
160 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 76–78 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, 
National Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition); Salinero, supra note 6. 
161 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 76–78 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, 
National Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition); Hughes, supra note 32, at 41–43 (not-
ing the various ways an informant can benefit from counsel and discussing the importance 
of counsel in the cooperation process in the context of defendants already charged with a 
crime and represented by counsel); Salinero, supra note 6; see also Natapoff, supra note 7, 
at 40 (discussing the unequal bargaining power between informants and law enforce-
ment); Richman, supra note 90, at 89; Rosenfeld et al., supra note 77, at 291 (stating that 
“street criminals . . . have great difficulty staking a legitimate claim to victim-status”); 
Weinstein, supra note 90, at 593. 
162 See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 183; Rich, supra note 5, at 690–92. 
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tors.163 An attorney familiar with the workings of the criminal justice 
system on a local level serves as a catch-all that counsels the individual 
and monitors law enforcement.164 Attorneys may help informants assess 
situations, communicate with courts, and understand their participa-
tion in drug rehabilitation programs.165 
 Furthermore, an attorney would ensure that nonviolent offenders 
are not employed in the targeting of violent felons.166 The attorney’s 
knowledge would help an informant realize a particular assignment’s 
scope and suitability.167 Therefore, an attorney’s presence would honor 
much of the original wording of Rachel’s Law, which considered an in-
formant’s substance abuse rehabilitation efforts, criminal background, 
and naivety.168 
B. How Restoring the Right to Counsel Serves the Interests  
of Law Enforcement 
 If informants had access to counsel, the attorney could ensure ad-
herence to Rachel’s Law, protect the informant, and provide law en-
forcement with informants capable of the task set forth.169 This, in 
turn, helps law enforcement by maintaining informants and minimiz-
ing their losses.170 
1. Shifting the Perspective of Law Enforcement Officials 
 An informant’s attorney would ensure adherence to Rachel’s Law, 
protect the informant, and serve law enforcement’s interests by provid-
ing only capable informants.171 The government’s one-sided cost-
benefit analysis places fighting crime above the interests of marginal-
                                                                                                                      
163 See Hughes, supra note 32, at 41–43; Richman, supra note 90, at 89; Weinstein, supra 
note 90, at 593. 
164 See Richman, supra note 90, at 89 (“In this situation, the advice of a defense attor-
ney will be critical, perhaps dispositive.”). 
165 See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 184–85 (noting the special vulnerability of drug us-
ers); Richman, supra note 90, at 89–91. 
166 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 667–68; Richman, supra note 90, at 91. 
167 See Richman, supra note 90, at 91 (describing the attorney’s role “as a monitor, even 
a guarantor, of the government’s performance”). 
168 See S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § (4)–(6), Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009); Natapoff, supra note 18, at 
667–68. 
169 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28(5)(a)–(h) (2010) (listing provisions which protect both in-
formants and investigations); Richman, supra note 90, at 91 (discussing counsel’s ability to 
“monitor . . . the government’s performance” in the context of defendants already 
charged with a crime and represented by counsel). 
170 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 666; Rich, supra note 5, at 698–99. 
171 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28(5)(a)–(h); Richman, supra note 90, at 91. 
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ized informants subject to criminal charges if they do not cooperate.172 
This analysis, however, does not acknowledge that there are various 
classes and abilities of informants.173 The classes include: coerced in-
formants—like the inexperienced Rachel Hoffman; paid informants; 
those motivated by duty, revenge, jealousy, or business interests; and 
those similar to the coerced informant class who make a plea-style 
agreement with prosecutors in exchange for leniency in sentencing.174 
Therefore, consideration of an informant’s class and the consequences 
of their abilities—or lack thereof—would keep informants safe and fur-
ther the fight against crime.175 Rachel’s Law in its original form aimed 
to remedy these problems.176 
 The informant institution has utility and value but law enforce-
ment officials fear that more rights for informants would impede effec-
                                                                                                                      
172 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 83–84, 89 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, Presi-
dent, National Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition). Without informants, Brooks says 
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would operate with impunity, and the safety of our Nation would be in jeopardy.” Id. at 78. 
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173 See Rich, supra note 5, at 690 (explaining that “[i]nformants assist the police for a 
variety of reasons”). Professor Rich further defines the classes: the coerced informant is 
promised leniency in exchange for cooperation, the paid informant is one on whom the 
police have no evidence of other crimes, and motivated informants may have “feelings of 
civic duty . . . a desire for revenge, jealousy, or the hope of using the police to eliminate 
criminal competitors.” Id. 
174 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 658–59; Rich, supra note 5, at 690. Defendants who 
enter into a plea agreement may sign what is known as a “5K.” See Natapoff, supra note 18, 
at 658 (stating that a defendant may receive a downward departure for providing substan-
tial assistance to a government investigation). The decision whether to provide a departure 
is still left to the discretion of the prosecutor and the court. Id. Cooperation agreements 
involving 5Ks are considered to be relatively transparent. Id. On the other hand, “the least 
transparent and therefore most problematic informant arrangement occurs where the 
informant is ‘flipped’ by a law enforcement agent at the moment of initial confrontation 
and potential arrest.” Id. at 659. This arrangement depends on the “idiosyncrasies of the 
particular officer” and is marked by its secrecy. Id. 
175 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 658–59 (discussing the problems inherent in secrecy); 
Rich, supra note 5, at 683 (discussing Hoffman’s case and the scrutiny it brought on the ac-
tions of the Tallahassee Police Department). Hoffman, in preparation for her fatal controlled 
buy, received “no training in conducting undercover police operations . . . .” Rich, supra note 
5, at 683. Apart from the tragedy of her death, the case brought harsh criticism to the Talla-
hassee police. See Presentment, supra note 135 (“[T]hrough poor planning and supervision, 
and a series of mistakes throughout the Transaction, T.P.D. handed Ms. Hoffman to Brad-
shaw and Green to rob and kill her as they saw fit.”). 
176 See S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § (4)–(6), Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009); Salinero, supra note 6 
(describing elements “stripped” from the original bill). 
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tive law enforcement.177 Prior the contested provisions’ removal from 
Rachel’s Law, a Florida Department of Law Enforcement representative 
told the State Senate Committee on Criminal Justice that encouraging 
informants to consult with counsel would bring drug investigations to a 
“‘screeching halt.’”178 Testifying before Congress in 2007, Ronald E. 
Brooks, President of the National Narcotic Officer’s Associations’ Coali-
tion, said, “[a]ltering law enforcement’s ability to use confidential in-
formants would tie the strong hand of state and local law enforcement 
behind its back.”179 Informant rights, however, could save lives and 
stem inefficient and counterproductive crime fighting measures.180 
 Resistance to informant system reform may be due to law enforce-
ment’s general “aversion and nauseous disdain” of informants, but re-
specting their humanity would further improve the system.181 Even the 
compromised form of Rachel’s Law is focused both on how informants 
serve investigations and how law enforcement serves informants.182 Po-
lice officers may, in their haste, sometimes utilize informants who are 
unsuited to particular assignments.183 In these situations, drug stings 
                                                                                                                      
177 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 69 (statement of Alexandra Natapoff, Professor of 
Law, Loyola Law School) (“The practice is, in many ways, a necessary evil. Without it, some 
kinds of cases could never be prosecuted or solved.”); Natapoff, supra note 3 (citing Ra-
chel’s Law as the first bill a state legislature has passed to address the issue of regulating 
criminal informants); Salinero, supra note 6. The guidelines enacted by New Jersey are 
concerned solely with the use of juveniles as confidential informants. See The New Jersey 
School Search Policy Manual, supra note 7, at A10-1–A10-4. Professor Natapoff pro-
poses “sunshine reforms” for the informant institution in order to improve overall public 
accountability, but she makes clear that her proposed measures are not intended to erect 
“substantive limits on informant use.” Natapoff, supra note 18, at 697. The only limits she 
proposes are to “informant rewards rather than informant activities.” Id. 
178 Salinero, supra note 6 (quoting Michael Ramage, General Counsel for the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement). 
179 Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 87 (statement of Ronald E. Brooks, President, Na-
tional Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition). 
180 See Presentment, supra note 135 (calling the actions of the Tallahassee police “un-
conscionable”); Natapoff, supra note 18, at 696 (calling for reform of the informant insti-
tution); Pecquet, supra note 3. Tallahassee Police Chief Dennis Jones called Hoffman’s 
murder “such an unusual occurrence,” and said that extensive review was necessary be-
cause of “the public attention that’s been called to it.” Pecquet, supra note 3. 
181 See Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent 
Provocateurs, 60 Yale L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951); Natapoff, supra note 18, at 658–59; see also 
Bloom, supra note 30, at 3 (citations omitted) (noting that Judas Iscariot “has become 
‘synonymous with betrayal’ and likened to Benedict Arnold”). While negative connota-
tions may attach to informants looking to eliminate competition, they may fit for coerced 
informants like Rachel Hoffman. See Rich, supra note 5, at 685, 691–92. 
182 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28 § 1(5)(a)–(h) (2010). 
183 See Rich, supra note 5, at 683; Salinero, supra note 6 (quoting the general counsel 
for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who said “‘informants must often be 
recruited for an undercover operation quickly’”). 
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may go awry, leaving law enforcement’s interest in efficient crime fight-
ing unsatisfied.184 If law enforcement officers adhere to Rachel’s Law, 
however, both parties benefit.185 For instance, the provision requiring 
consideration of an informant’s emotional stability protects both the 
informant’s well-being and law enforcement’s interest in successful op-
erations.186 Likewise, the provision requiring consideration of age and 
maturity protects the safety of ill-prepared informants and the integrity 
of criminal investigations.187 
2. Minimizing the Likelihood of “Burning” Informants 
 Supplying informants with counsel would help them to under-
stand their abilities and expectations, thereby limiting the “burning” of 
snitches and improving relations between police and informants.188 
Law enforcement departments try to avoid burning snitches because 
those that send unsuited informants into dangerous situations or reveal 
identities may have difficulty recruiting informants in the future.189 
This type of integrity maintenance is present in most cooperation rela-
tionships.190 Professor Graham Hughes wrote about informants who 
testify at trial: 
The cooperating witness is not a strong candidate for sympa-
thy . . . . But, whatever his moral worth, his fate under and af-
ter the cooperation agreement deserves attention because it is 
an important index of the fairness and integrity of the prose-
cutorial system. A bargain is, after all, a bargain. Double deal-
ing by the State will create doubts about the rectitude of the 
criminal justice process.191 
The events surrounding Rachel Hoffman’s death, sparked community 
outrage.192 A lasting repercussion of her death, however, is the likeli-
hood that future offenders recruited by the Tallahassee Police Depart-
                                                                                                                      
184 See Rich, supra note 5, at 683; Pecquet, supra note 3; Salinero, supra note 6. 
185 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28. 
186 See id. § 914.28(5)(f); Presentment, supra note 135 (“[Hoffman’s] inexperience, 
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187 See Fla. Stat. § 914.28(5)(a); Presentment, supra note 135. 
188 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 666; Rich, supra note 5, at 698–99. 
189 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 666; Rich, supra note 5, at 698–99. 
190 See Hughes, supra note 32, at 40. 
191 Id. 
192 See Pecquet, supra note3; Natapoff, supra note 3. 
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ment will be more hesitant to cooperate.193 These individuals may find 
the criminal justice system less risky than being mishandled as an in-
formant.194 
 While Hoffman’s situation illuminated inequities in informant re-
cruitment, the case of Chad MacDonald highlights problems with po-
lice practices during and after an informant’s use.195 Police released 
MacDonald as an informant after a traffic stop turned into charges for 
methamphetamine possession.196 After police released him from his 
duties, and without the protection and secrecy provided by his han-
dlers, word spread that he snitched and he was then murdered.197 To 
make matters worse, MacDonald’s assailants also raped and murdered 
his sixteen-year-old girlfriend.198 Retaliatory attacks like these discour-
age potential informants from cooperating by forcing a choice between 
becoming lifelong informants, forever under police protection, or 
death.199 
 The fear of retaliation affects the lives of many police infor-
mants.200 For example, Sammy “The Bull” Gravano—a mafia hit man-
turned informant—entered the federal witness protection program, 
likely to evade retaliation.201 Having an identity revealed “seems more 
worrisome to street criminals than jail time, and for good reason.”202 
The dangers of exposure and retaliation may worsen after the infor-
mant relationship terminates because police sometimes punish infor-
mants who stop cooperation or run out of information.203 Police may 
punish informants by revealing identities to suspects or picking up in-
formants and driving them through their own neighborhood, making 
                                                                                                                      
193 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 666 (noting that agencies which mishandle infor-
mants may have difficulty recruiting new ones); Rich, supra note 5, at 698–99. 
194 See Rich, supra note 5, at 698–99; Rosenfeld et al., supra note 77, at 304. 
195 See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 41; Santiago, supra note 22, at 778; Martelle & Hayes, 
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196 Martelle & Hayes, supra note 21. 
197 See id. 
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2012] “Rachel’s Law” and the Protection of Drug Informants 415 
others see their cooperation firsthand.204 One informant explained, 
“‘the police come and get you . . . and drop you off in the middle of the 
fucking neighbourhood where everybody’s at. “Thank you!” They ride 
the fuck off and throw $50 out the window.’”205 
 Some police officers believe in making examples of uncooperative 
or misbehaving informants, thereby providing better control over 
them.206 This tactic can backfire, however, when criminals become con-
vinced that cooperating with particular law enforcement agencies is not 
a worthwhile endeavor.207 In these circumstances, “the discipline of the 
marketplace” serves to protect informants.208 One study of informants 
found that “[a] number of interviewees implied or declared outright 
that the authorities would promise one thing and do another, going 
back on their word and leaving them, as ‘tattletales’, in the lurch. In-
forming, in this sense, was pointless.”209 
 Restoring the original legal counsel provision of Rachel’s Law 
would address the problems attendant to informant burning.210 An at-
torney may warn the potential informant about a particular law en-
forcement agency’s penchant for burning informants.211 As a “repeat 
player,” counsel is more likely to know the history of an agency.212 Par-
ticularly, counsel could supplement an informant’s knowledge about an 
agency’s tendency to punish and would help in deciding whether navi-
gating the criminal justice system is safer and more prudent.213 A law-
yer’s advice on appropriate punishments will guard against police coer-
cion by negating an officer’s threats of impossible or nonexistent 
charges.214 
                                                                                                                      
204 Id. 
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207 See Natapoff, supra note 18, at 666; Rich, supra note 5, at 698–99; Rosenfeld et al., 
supra note 77, at 300. 
208 Richman, supra note 90, at 109–10 (discussing situations where the government 
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 Police departments may resist the change that an attorney’s advice 
would bring to the informant system because of its potential impact on 
tactics.215 If informants as a class become accustomed to police mis-
treatment and deceit, however, they may choose to take their chances 
in the criminal justice system.216 As a result, law enforcement would 
then lose an irreplaceable tool for fighting crime, particularly in minor-
ity communities where distrust of the police is already high.217 
C. Reform Similar to a Restored “Rachel’s Law” 
 Adopting an attorney provision similar to the one excluded from 
Rachel’s Law reduces the likelihood of harm to unsuitable informants, 
benefits law enforcement agencies, and protects communities.218 Un-
fortunately, informant handling tragedies have preceded reform legis-
lation in the few states that have enacted it.219 The murders of Hoffman 
and MacDonald, for example, led to legislation in Florida and Califor-
nia, respectively.220 
 Texas, too, enacted “output measures” to buoy the reputation of its 
law enforcement agencies after many embarrassing, fraudulent, and 
                                                                                                                      
215 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 78 (testimony of Ronald E. Brooks, President, Na-
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217 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 78 (testimony of Ronald E. Brooks, President, Na-
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218 See S.B. 604, 2009 Fla. S. § 5(b), Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009); Richman, supra note 90, at 
74 (noting the benefits of counsel when defendants are negotiating cooperation agree-
ments). 
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220 See Santiago, supra note 22, at 781; Salinero, supra note 6. 
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botched drug stings.221 For instance, a Hearne, Texas drug task force 
arrested twenty-eight people after a November, 2000 tip by suicidal 
drug informant Derrick Megress.222 He had accepted a prosecutor’s 
offer of clemency in exchange for producing at least twenty arrests.223 
Prosecutors exonerated each suspect arrested at Hearne’s behest, 
though some had already pleaded guilty.224 
 The Texas Department of Public Safety enacted new output meas-
ures as a means of altering its priorities in drug enforcement.225 Patrick 
O’Burke, Commander of the Texas Public Safety Commission Narcotics 
Service, explained that output measures have traditionally been de-
fined by “[t]he number of investigations and/or investigative reports 
written[,] [t]he number of arrests for narcotics law violations[,] [and] 
[t]he amount of illegal drugs seized.”226 The previous output measures 
emphasized overall volume of arrests but did not reduce drug activ-
ity.227 O’Burke instead recommended a definition of success based on 
the disruption of drug distribution.228 
 Thus, the new output measures emphasize the “[n]umber of Drug 
Trafficking Organizations dismantled[,] [p]ercentage of arrests de-
fined as ‘targeted’ Drug Trafficking Organization members[,] . . . . 
[and] [p]ercentage of total arrests that are defined as ‘End Users.’”229 
Law enforcement should desire a reduction of end user arrests, opting 
instead to enroll them in “treatment, corrections or rehabilitation op-
                                                                                                                      
221 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 11–12 (testimony of Patrick O’Burke, Com-
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tions.”230 Therefore, “investigations against these individuals should 
receive no priority from drug enforcement initiatives that seek to dis-
rupt illegal trafficking.”231 
 The new Texas output measures demonstrate a recalibration of 
priorities, favoring efficiency and community protection over gross 
drug-related arrests.232 Officers will be more properly focused on “iden-
tifying and disrupting [the] illegal distribution of drugs,” thereby creat-
ing efficiencies and protecting the community.233 The output measures 
implicitly encourage police to improve informant control and man-
agement, thus reducing the tendency to burn informants and creating 
more trust in law enforcement.234 
 Texas’ paradigm shift suggests that other states may also welcome 
informant reform.235 Enacting reform before its precipitation by trag-
edy and community outrage would save lives, ensure efficient crime 
fighting, and protect vulnerable community members.236 Restoring the 
legal counsel provision stripped from Rachel’s Law would further en-
hance the efficacy of each of these factors.237 
Conclusion 
 Informants are an essential tool to law enforcement and must be 
protected. They are invaluable because their credibility enables them to 
infiltrate criminal organizations, especially in the context of drug 
crimes. The lack of informant regulations on the state level, however, 
leaves informants and communities unprotected. In particular, grant-
ing legal counsel to potential informants before cooperating with po-
lice would make them knowledgeable about their circumstances and 
                                                                                                                      
230 Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 15 (statement of Patrick O’Burke, Commander, 
Texas Public Safety Commission Narcotics Service). 
231 Id. 
232 See id. 
233 See id.; Natapoff, supra note 18, at 666; Rich, supra note 5, at 698–99. 
234 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 11–16 (testimony and statement of Patrick 
O’Burke, Commander, Texas Public Safety Commission Narcotics Service) (discussing how 
“end-users” should not be the priority of law enforcement); Natapoff, supra note 7, at 128 
(“[T]he public policy of using informants itself contributes to the sense that today’s law 
enforcement is all too often unreliable or unfair.”); Natapoff, supra note 18, at 666; Rich, 
supra note 5, at 698–99. 
235 See Joint Hearing, supra note 17, at 11 (statement of Patrick O’Burke, Commander, 
Texas Public Safety Commission Narcotics Service) (acknowledging the need for “sweep-
ing reform”). 
236 See Santiago, supra note 22, at 780–81; Salinero, supra note 6; Pecquet, supra note 3. 
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options. Furthermore, an attorney’s advice would benefit law enforce-
ment by providing only those informants competent for the assigned 
task. A right to counsel would also minimize instances where infor-
mants are mistreated or burned by law enforcement agencies. Prevent-
ing informant burning increases the public’s trust in law enforcement 
and ensures that future informants remain willing to cooperate. De-
spite these arguments in favor of proper informant treatment, Florida 
stripped provisions granting an informant the right to counsel from 
“Rachel’s Law,” the first informant protection legislation passed in the 
United States. The legal counsel provision should, however, be restored 
to Rachel’s Law and other states should adopt similar legislation to fur-
ther protect the rights and lives of informants across the country. 
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